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RUTH DONNER * 
 
Dual Nationality in International Law 
 
Abstract. The presentation begins with introductory remarks centred principally on the 
topicality of the legal status of dual nationals. Whereas earlier the doctrine of State sovereignty 
required that an individual have only one nationality, the status of dual nationality is now 
increasingly accepted, though not created, by States. The development of human rights law 
is of importance insofar as statelessness is now considered to be a greater evil. It then 
continues with some basic principles in international law, the first being that it is for each 
State to decide who are its nationals. This leads to a discussion of some landmarks in the 
development of the international law of nationality: the Tunis and Morocco Nationality 
Decrees before the PCIJ in 1923; the League of Nations codifying Convention on Certain 
Questions Relating to the Conflict of nationality Laws, 1930; and the Nottebohm case before 
the ICJ, 1953, in particular. Te greatest contribution to the topic has come from the Iran–United 
States Claims Tribunal, for three reasons: for rejecting Article 4 of the 1930 Convention, 
embodying the principle of non-responsibility; further, it clarified how dominant and effective 
nationality can be determined for the purposes of the nationality of claims; and it developed 
the equitable doctrine contained in the caveat to Case A/18 that the status of dual nationality 
must not be used unjustly or fraudulently. Lastly, the possibility of a “dormant” nationality is 
accepted, and the European Convention on Nationality, 1997, and the International Law 
Commission’s drafts on Diplomatic Protection noted. 
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Introductory Remarks 
 
The subject of my presentation1 is both an interesting and a topical one. I say 
‘interesting’ because, though not unique in this, questions relating to dual 
nationality arise in national law, private international law–or, as the Americans 
say, conflict of laws–and public international law. Public international law 
comes last, but in this questions of nationality touch on the very definition of 
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statehood, the existence of a permanent population being an essential pre-
condition for it. 
 And I say ‘topical’ because whereas when national status was the sole link 
between the individual and international law, and allegiance and protection the 
links between the individual and the ruler, it was for each individual to have one, 
and only one, nationality. At the Hague Conference on the Codification of 
International Law, 1930, there was reference to the ‘twin evils’ of statelessness 
and dual nationality in connection with the Convention on the Conflict of 
Nationality Laws. In his classic work on Dual Nationality of 1961, Professor 
Bar-Yaacov refers to the ‘problems’ of dual nationality. 
 In recent years, however, it has become more common for countries to 
recognize the status of dual nationality. This is not to say that States create 
dual nationals. On the contrary, it only means that States recognize that their 
nationals may also possess the nationality of another State and that they do not 
lose their nationality by operation of law on acquiring another one, as, for 
example, was common practice when a woman acquired the nationality of her 
husband on marriage. One can mention the recent nationality legislation of 
Spain (2002), Finland (2003) and Ireland (2002). As a matter of policy, the 
Egyptian Minister of the Interior was using his administrative powers in 2004 
to pass Egyptian nationality to children of Egyptian mothers and alien fathers, 
mostly from neighbouring Arab states, pending amended legislation permitting 
married women to retain their nationality. Since 1998, Mexicans naturalized in 
the United States have been able to retain Mexican nationality. 
 Acceptance of dual national status in national law has resulted in renewed 
interest in dual nationality as a sociological fact and as a problem in political 
science. Thus the 1997 publication of the British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law entitled, Citizenship. The White Paper lists in Part One eigh-
teen “Hallmarks of Citizenship”, of which 14 are rights and 4 duties. 
 Also of present concern is the question of how far modern developments in 
human rights law are relevant to our topic. 
 Art. 15 of the UN General Assembly’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that “Everyone has the right to a nationality.” Art. 24 (3) of the 
UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, and Art. 7 (9) of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, provide for a child’s right to 
citizenship, or nationality. In the International Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, 1966, Art. 5 (d) (iii) refers to “The right to nationality.” 
However, these articles do not amount to a right to a specific nationality, and 
highlight the dysfunctional, or asymmetrical, nature of international human 
rights law. A State, by virtue of its sovereign powers, may divest itself of 
rights in favour of individuals, but it cannot in the same manner pass over its 
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duties and liability for civil wrongs. International criminal courts are another 
matter. A State cannot be sentenced to prison. 
 On the other hand, Art. 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration continues, 
“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.” Other attempts have 
been made to curb the number of stateless persons. The UN Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, which entered into force in 1975, went further 
than earlier enactments in that it placed an obligation on States. Deprivation of 
nationality is not just condemned when “arbitrary”, but when it results in 
statelessness (Art. 8). States parties undertake to grant nationality to persons, 
otherwise stateless, who reside on its territory. 
 In November 1999 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
adopted the Charter for European Security at Istanbul. There it was stated that 
“no one should be deprived of his or her nationality arbitrarily… We also 
commit ourselves to further the international protection of stateless persons.” 
With the development of human rights law it has become clear that stateless-
ness is a greater “evil” than dual nationality. 
 
 
Dual Nationality and International Law 
 
1. Some basic principles 
 
The basic principles in public international law as regards this topic–bearing in 
mind that nationality differs from citizenship, which is more relevant in 
national law, and also from “ethnic nationality”–may be listed as follows: 
 (a) It is for each State to determine who are its nationals, and if this should 
lead to a person possessing two nationalities it does not mean half of one 
nationality and half of another.2 
 (b) A State cannot decide who are the nationals of another State. For example, 
an English court has stated that there is no such thing as a German national by 
English law.3 
 And to this one may add: 
 (c) There is no such thing as a State’s national by virtue of international law. 
 I could mention two instances when an international body has been confronted 
with this, though both are concerned with reinstatement of an earlier existing 
nationality. 
  
 2 Donner, R.: The Regulation of Nationality in International Law. 2nd ed., New 
York, 1995. 205. 
 3 Oppenheimer v. Cattermole; Weekly Law Reports (1975), 347. 
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 First, the case of Mr Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, a national of Israel by birth, 
who acquired Peruvian nationality by naturalization in 1984 and was deprived 
of it in 1997 following his broadcasts disseminating news on torture committed 
by members of the Peruvian Army Intelligence Service. On March 31, 1999, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted the case to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and requested that the Court order Peru to 
restore and ensure Mr Bronstein’s full enjoyment of his rights that had been 
violated, and in particular that he be able to have his Peruvian nationality fully 
and unconditionally recognized.4 
 In the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Eritrea requested, inter alia, that 
the Commission order the reinstatement of the Ethiopian nationality of tens of 
thousands of people, referring to Ethiopian nationals of Eritrean “descent, blood 
or affiliation” who were deprived of their Ethiopian nationality during the 
conflict of 1998–2000. The Commission found this to be outside its juris-
diction.5 Further to this, the Commission recognized that some States permit 
their nationals to possess another nationality while others do not: “International 
law prohibits neither position”.6 
 
2. Some landmarks in public international law 
 
The Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees7 was the first pronouncement of the 
International Court regarding nationality questions. There Britain had objected 
to French decrees of 1921 granting French nationality also to British nationals 
resident in the French protectorates of Tunisia and the French zone of Morocco, 
without giving such persons an option of nationality, and had finally taken the 
matter to the Council of the League. France, on the other hand, argued that 
nationality questions were solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and 
hence outside the competence of the League and the Permanent Court. The 
question of competence was put before the Court by the League, and in its 
Opinion the Court stated, in a famous passage: “The question whether a certain 
matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially 
relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations. 
  
 4 International Legal Materials, 125 (2001), 40. 
 5 Partial Award, Civilians Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27–32, December 17, 
2004, Paragraphs 23–25. 
 6 Ibid. paragraph 59. 
 7 Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 4 (1923) 24. 
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Thus, in the present state of international law questions of nationality are, in the 
opinion of the Court, in principle within the reserved domain.” 
 This left open the development of international law as regards nationality. 
In the League of Nations codification of international law, the Committee of 
Experts set up by the League in 1924 considered a number of topics as possibly 
ripe for codification, finally settling on three topics for the Codification 
Conference, one of which was Nationality. The resulting Hague Convention on 
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 1930, entered 
into force in 1937 and was, as already mentioned, especially concerned with 
cases of dual nationality. In particular, Art. 4 stated: “A State may not afford 
diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality 
such person also possesses.”8 This was so drafted in order to ensure the principle 
of non-responsibility, that a State was not responsible in the international 
sphere for injurious acts against its own subjects. 
 On the other hand, dual national status in fact was implicitly recognized in 
the Convention. Where a conflict arose, account should be taken of the person’s 
choice. Thus, Art. 5 of the Convention: “Within a third State a person having 
more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one… [A] third 
State shall recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the 
country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of 
the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most 
closely connected.” 
 Similar wording appears in Art. 1 of the Protocol Relating to Military Obli-
gations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality.9 A dual national is liable for 
military service in that country of his nationality where he ordinarily or habitually 
resides. This is a formula applied in treaty law concerning military service of 
dual nationals. So, too, in other connections as, for example, for judges on inter-
national courts or, indeed, international civil servants in general. This was 
applied most recently for judges on the ICTY or the ICTR (the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively) who 
might be nationals of two or more States. Security Council Resolution 1411 of 17 
May 2002 amended Art. 12 of the ICTY statute and Art. 11 of the ICTR statute, 
providing that such judges be regarded as bearing solely the nationality of the 
State in which they “ordinarily exercise civil and political rights.” The wording is 
slightly different. 
  
 8 League Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 179, 9. The Preamble stated that every person 
should have “one nationality only.” Donner: op. cit. 46, note 47. 
 9 League Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 178. 227. 
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 The Nottebohm case before the present International Court of Justice 
further clarified the meaning of a dual national’s “close connection” with the 
State of one of his nationalities. The principal facts of this case were as 
follows: Friedrich Nottebohm was born in Hamburg, Germany, in 1881 and 
under German law was a German national. In 1905 he moved to Guatemala 
and resided and worked there until his arrest in 1943. In 1939, shortly before 
the outbreak of the Second World War, Nottebohm went to Liechtenstein and 
there acquired Liechtenstein nationality within a matter of weeks, before 
returning to Guatemala. This was in accordance with the Liechtenstein Law of 
Nationality of 1934, which permitted dispensation from the normal residence 
requirements in special circumstances. He then lost German nationality. After 
the end of the War Liechtenstein, as the country of his nationality, espoused 
Nottebohm’s claim and resorted to international judicial proceedings, before 
the International Court of Justice, claiming special and general damages for 
Guatemala’s wrongful arrest, detention, and expulsion of Mr Nottebohm (as 
well as) the restitution of property wrongfully seized from him between 1942 
and 1946. Here Liechtenstein exercised its right to diplomatic protection of 
one of its nationals. 
 In its 1953 Judgment the Court dismissed Guatemala’s preliminary objection 
to jurisdiction on the grounds that the Court was not properly seised of the 
case.10 In its 1955 Judgment,11 on the merits, the Court dismissed Liechtenstein’s 
claim as inadmissible on the grounds that the factual connection between 
Nottebohm and Liechtenstein “in the period preceding, contemporaneous with, 
and following his naturalization” was found not to be sufficiently close.12 
Before that, the Court had stated that “nationality is a legal bond having as its 
basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence…”.13 But 
the Court here was dealing not so much with the requirement of a genuine link 
for purposes of naturalization but with a question of opposability. This is clear 
in that the Court goes on to state that Liechtenstein was “not entitled to extend 
its protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis Guatemala.”14 The Court did not overrule 
Liechtenstein’s conferment of nationality on Nottebohm. It could not do that. 
Nor did it revive his German nationality. Here I do not entirely agree with the 
  
 10 I.C.J. Reports, 1953. 111. 
 11 I.C.J. Reports, 1955. 4. 
 12 Ibid. at 24 
 13 Ibid. at 22. 
 14 Ibid. at 26. 
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Encyclopedia of Public International Law,15 that the Nottebohm case deals 
“only with diplomatic protection as a consequence of conferment of nationality 
by naturalization.” 
 At the same time, we must remember that Nottebohm had never acquired 
Guatemalan nationality. The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, on the other 
hand, deals with claims brought by dual Iranian–United States nationals. 
 
3. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
 
This was the first major claims commission to function since those established 
in connection with the peace settlements at the end of World War II. Thirty-four 
volumes of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal Reports have so far been 
published. Volumes 35 and 36 are already referred to as nearing completion. 
 The agreement to set up the Tribunal, being the Claims Settlement Decla-
ration of 1981, was negotiated–although not face-to-face–between Iran and the 
United States in the Algerian capital Algiers. Its mandate was “to decide claims 
of nationals of the United States against Iran and the claims of nationals of Iran 
against the United States… [that]… arise out of debts, contracts… expropria-
tions or other measures affecting property rights”.16 It has been estimated that 
at the time when the Islamic Revolutionary government was established in 
Teheran, in February 1979, some 40,000 United States nationals were residing 
and working in Iran. This was mostly in connection with what the late Shah’s 
widow has recently called “the White Revolution”. The Tribunal’s function was 
a form of diplomatic protection in that individual claims of U.S. nationals were 
pre-empted, and withdrawn from United States courts. 
 The importance of this Claims Tribunal for our topic may be shown in 
three ways. 
 Firstly, in case A/18,17 decided on 6 April 1984, the Full Tribunal was 
requested in accordance with its jurisdiction to interpret the meaning of United 
States national in Art. II of the Claims Settlement Declaration for purposes of 
presentation of a claim. This question arose because Iran objected to claims 
brought by naturalized American citizens on the ground that they were Iranian 
nationals by birth and Iran does not in its legislation recognize an individual’s 
right to abandon nationality, except under strict conditions. Iran’s argument 
before the Full Tribunal was based principally on Art. 4 of the Hague Con-
  
 15 Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam (et 
al.), 3, (1992) 501 at 506. 
 16 Art. II Claims Settlement Declaration, 19 January 1981. 
 17 5 Iran–United States Claims Tribunal Reports (U.S.C.T.R), 251. 
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vention of 1930, mentioned above, as being the expression of the classic rule 
of non-responsibility. The Tribunal dealt at length with Iran’s argument and 
then rejected this line of reasoning on the basis of its analysis of historical 
practice, that international tribunals had long experience of dealing with claims 
of dual nationals, the doctrine on the subject, and also on an analysis of Art. 4 
of the Hague Convention. The Full Tribunal held that Art. 4 must be “inter-
preted very cautiously”, that not only was it more than 50 years old and much 
had changed since then, but also it was “found in a treaty to which only twenty 
States are parties…” To this I may add here that Habermas has noted that in 
1998 only four member States of the European Community had ratified the 
Convention. 
 Taking into account that Art. 4 of the 1930 Convention no longer expresses 
an unambiguous rule, an international court must still consider the factual 
connection, the genuine link, between an individual and his State of nationality 
that would permit that State to grant diplomatic protection against another State 
whose nationality that person also possesses. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
provides an abundant jurisprudence dealing with the determination of a dual 
national claimant’s dominant and effective nationality. 
 Without looking at all aspects of this, I want to refer to one point. In his 
1999 Hague lectures on “Conflits de Nationalités”18 Michel Verwilghen was 
critical of my treatment of the Malek case before the Tribunal.19 I am not sure 
that I follow his argument as to what I “insinuated”, but I was indeed wrong in 
questioning the Tribunal’s scrutiny of the whole life of the claimant in order to 
determine the dominant and effective nationality during the relevant (for the 
espousal of a claim) period from the date of the alleged injury until the date of 
bringing the claim, that is, the 19 January 1981, the date of the agreement to 
set up the Tribunal. It is general practice that for a dual national, in the “Art. 4” 
sense, a factual assessment must be made to determine the dominant and 
effective nationality during the relevant period, and in this a Tribunal, as the 
International Court in the Nottebohm case, “will consider all relevant factors, 
including habitual residence, center of interests, family ties, participation in 
public life and other evidence of attachment.” In Malek the Tribunal then 
continued to elaborate on this, stating that “the entire life of the Claimant, from 
birth, and all the factors which, during this span of time, evidence the reality 
and the sincerity of the choice of national allegiance he claims to have made, 
are relevant.”20 The rather curious result is that the entire life of the claimant is 
  
 18 Vol. 277 Recueil des Cours. 
 19 23 June 1988, 19 Iran–U.S.C.T.R. 48; Donner: op. cit. 89–104. 
 20 Ghaffari in 31 Iran–U.S.C.T.R. 60 at 65. 
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relevant to determining dominance during the relevant period.21 In this the 
Tribunal shows a steady jurisprudence, in cases both before and after Malek. 
 Thirdly, the Iran-U.S. Tribunal has contributed to the development of 
international law regarding dual nationality in its application of the caveat 
contained in case A/18. This provided that, “In cases where the Tribunal finds 
jurisdiction based upon a dominant and effective nationality of the claimant, 
the other nationality may remain relevant to the merits of the claim”, and “It is 
also often admitted that no international protection is given to a dual national 
as regards rights acquired by him through the use of his ‘other nationality’, if 
such rights are validly reserved to its citizens by the other State.”22 Although 
the Tribunal has found on numerous occasions that there is no cause for a 
claim to be barred by the caveat (e.g. Ghaffari) it has also found it to be 
applicable as, most recently, in Aryeh (M) v. Iran.23 In particular, the Tribunal 
concluded here that “while the caveat in Case A18 is relevant to this case, its 
application should result not in the barring of the entire claim, but in the 
applying of a discount to the market value of the property”. And, “the Tribunal 
must rely on its discretion to quantify a discount that is reasonable and equitable 
taking into account all the circumstances in this case”.24 This invoking of equity 
is in line with the early Esphahanian case,25 citing the Flegenheimer case,26 
to the effect that international courts may deny jurisdiction in cases of dual 
nationality “on equitable grounds in cases of fraudulent use of nationality.” 
 The requirement of bona fides appears also in the United Nations Claims 
Commission. This is a quasi-judicial body, not an arbitral tribunal for traditional 
diplomatic protection and espousal of claims, set up under Security Council 
Resolution 692 of 20 May 1991 to handle the circa 2.6 million claims arising 
out of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Although eligibility to 
bring a claim is not based on nationality it is stipulated that Iraqi nationals 
may not bring claims. This was further clarified in the Governing Council 
(of the Commission) Decree of 28 November 1991: “Claims will not be 
considered on behalf of Iraqi nationals who do not have bona fide nationality of 
another State.”27 
  
 21 Aldrich, G. H.: The Jurisprudence of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, 
1996. 59. 
 22 A/18 at 265–266 and 274. 
 23 33 Iran–U.S.C.T.R, 368. 
 24 Ibid. 395, paragraphs 85 and 86. 
 25 2 Iran–U.S.C.T.R, 161–162. 
 26 U.S. v. Italy, 14 UN Reports of International Arbitration Awards, 327 at 378. 
 27 See 31 International Legal Materials (1992) 1009. Donner: op. cit. 386. 
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4. “Dormant” nationality 
 
One matter not referred to so far, but of contemporary relevance, is the question 
of what I have called “dormant” nationality, where one full nationality exists 
together with a dormant one.28 This phenomenon is not quite the same as dual 
nationality because there are not two, or more, concurrent nationalities of, in 
principle though not necessarily in fact, equal weight. But it also has the 
character of dual nationality in that the dormant nationality may be activated at 
any time, simply on request and following certain formalities. 
 An example of this occurred in Germany before reunification.29 Art. 16 of 
the West German Basic Law dealt with nationality of the Federal Republic, while 
Art. 116 covered those persons who possessed German nationality within the 
borders of territory of the German State as it existed on 31 December 1937. 
This was in accordance with Art. 146 of the Basic Law in which the concept 
of a united Germany was reiterated. In the Teso case before the W. German 
Federal Constitutional Court, 1987,30 this same concept of a common German 
nationality was applied in favour of an East German national even though the 
1967 Nationality Law of the Democratic Republic had no equivalent to Art. 116 
of the Federal Republic’s Basic Law. Thus when the inhabitants of the former 
East Germany streamed west just before the collapse of that State, West 
German embassies could take them in, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
 The same applies in other divided States. Thus in the 2001 Irish Nationality 
and Citizenship Act, “section 3.6.-(1) Every person born in the island of 
Ireland is entitled to be an Irish citizen.” The case of Korea is more complex 
due to the magnitude of the problems involved: the number of inhabitants is 
more evenly divided than in the former two Germanies; the poverty is greater in 
the one half, here the northern; the common border is even more impenetrable; 
and the neighbours less accommodating. Yet even there I understand that 
North Koreans who reach South Korea are given South Korean nationality on 
preferential terms. Citizenship of the European Union adds further interest to 
this question. 
 As international law does not prohibit dual nationality, there can be no such 
prohibition on a State, by virtue of its inherent sovereign powers, granting its 
nationality preferentially to whomever it pleases. No conflict of nationalities is 
involved, because the one only becomes active where there is a genuine link 
  
 28 Donner: op. cit. 204–i.e. in preference to “virtual” nationality. 
 29 Donner: op. cit. 288–291. 
 30 (91) International Law Reports, 213–235. 
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and where the individual invokes his right to it. The nationality is not imposed 
on the individual against his will because it is only dormant.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The European Convention on Nationality, 1997,31 is relevant for a number of 
the points discussed here. Although this is a regional treaty it is important 
because there are now forty-six members of the Council of Europe and, in 
addition, States not members of the Council may be parties to its treaties. 
 Art. 4 (b) provides: “Statelessness shall be avoided.” There is no such 
prohibition of dual nationality. 
 On page 16 of the accompanying Explanatory Report it was acknowledged 
that the conflict of laws arising from multiple nationality was the “most important 
area which it has not been possible to include in the Convention… However, a 
growing number of States are making use of the notion of ‘habitual residence’, 
when persons regularly and effectively live in a particular place.” 
 Further, the International Law Commission had by August 2004 produced 
one Preliminary and five consequent numbered Reports on Diplomatic Protec-
tion, partly of relevance for our topic today. Thus Art. 6 of the First Report, of 7 
March 2000, states: “Subject to Art. 9, paragraph 4, the State of nationality may 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of an injured national against a State 
of which the injured person is also a national where the individual’s [dominant 
and effective] nationality is that of the former State.” A note states that Art. 9, 
paragraph 4, will read: “Diplomatic protection may not be exercised by a new 
state of nationality against a previous State of nationality for injury incurred 
during the period when the person was a national only of the latter State.” It is 
not clear what this adds to the present rules on continuity of nationality. 
 Finally, and in conclusion, it may be said that the greatest contribution to this 
topic in recent years has been made by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: 
it has improved on the tools for dealing with complex factual situations in the 
determination of dominant nationality, and it has applied equitable principles 
to control the status of dual nationals. This is to say, in international law an 
individual who has dual nationality has a right to choice as in the objective 
determination of his dominant and effective nationality, but, also, he has the 
duty not to abuse this right, as provided in the caveat in the A/18 case. 
  
 31 European Treaty Series, No. 166. 
